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In recent years, the Supreme Court has actively defined the scope of
federal preemption. In a series of decisions, it has interpreted the various
preemption doctrines broadly to prohibit state action that interferes with
important federal policies. In Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., for example, it
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reaffirmed the strong federal preemption of state tort lawsuits involving
medical devices.1 Likewise, in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee,
the Court ruled that so-called "fraud on the FDA" claims were preempted by
the federal regulatory regime. 2
Thus, the Court's recent decision in Wyeth v. Levine3 was surprising. In
Wyeth, the Court held that the Food and Drug Act did not preempt a state-law
tort suit for failure to warn of the alleged dangers of a pharmaceutical
product.4 Specifically, the Court found that the Act did not preempt a state-
law tort suit alleging that the labeling for an anti-nausea medication,
Phenergan, did not sufficiently warn about the risks associated with IV-push
administration of the drug.5 It therefore affirmed the ruling of the Vermont
Supreme Court that upheld a jury verdict against the manufacturer brought
by a musician whose arm had been amputated after she developed gangrene
as a result of improper administration.
Already, Wyeth has been interpreted by some as sounding the death knell
for the preemption doctrine in the context of pharmaceutical products. 6
However, a careful analysis of the Court's decision indicates that this is far
from the case. The majority underscored that its decision was a "narrow" one
based largely on the facts and circumstances before it.7 In particular, the
Court made a point of noting that the record was devoid of evidence that the
particular risks at issue had actually been considered by the FDA and that the
defendant had thus failed to show that there was an actual conflict between
1 128 S. Ct. 999, 1001 (2008).
2 531 U.S. 341, 344 (2001); see also Daniel E. Troy & Rebecca K. Wood, Federal
Preemption at the Supreme Court, 2007-2008 CATO SUP. CT. REv. 257, 258 (observing
that "the Court does appear to be deciding in favor of preemption somewhat more often
than usual, and by greater margins").
3 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009).
4 Id. at 1204.
5 1d.
6 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Wyeth is Victory for Consumers, Blow to
Preemption, 45 TRIAL 54, 56 (2009) ("Wyeth is a significant decision and a major victory
for consumers, and if the Court follows its own commands, preemption faces a much
more difficult future."); Margaret Cronin Fisk, Ruling Reopens Drug Lawsuits, NEWARK
STAR-LEDGER, May 3, 2009, at D1 ('Every failure-to-wam case against a drug company
has been affected' by the Wyeth ruling, said Michael Miller, a plaintiffs' attorney in
Alexandria, Va."); Miriam Hill, High Court Upholds Right to Sue Drugmakers, PHILA.
INQUIRER, May 5, 2009, at Al ("The [Wyeth] case had been billed as the most important
business decision in several years because it is likely to affect consumer litigation against
many industries.").
7 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194.
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FDA regulation and the state-law tort suit.8 The majority's analysis therefore
suggests that state-law tort suits based on an alleged failure to warn are
preempted in cases in which the FDA has specifically considered the
particular risks at issue and has determined that the pharmaceutical product's
labeling adequately warns of those risks.
Such a ruling would not only be consistent with the analysis in Wyeth,
but would have significant benefits. As the Court has repeatedly recognized,
there is an inherent tension between the congressional establishment of a
federal regulatory regime for the labeling of pharmaceuticals and medical
devices by experts at the FDA and allowing a jury of ordinary citizens with
no specialized expertise to render their own judgment regarding, and in effect
overrule, such expert determinations. The FDA typically engages in
extensive review and analysis of drug labeling not only before it is initially
promulgated, but on an ongoing basis to ensure that it is consistent with the
safe and effective use of the pharmaceutical product. As several members of
the Court have noted, there is a potential danger in allowing these expert
decisions to be undermined by state court juries.9 Moreover, such an
outcome may have undesirable indirect effects, such as raising the prices of
pharmaceutical products to satisfy state-court judgments that are not
warranted based on the best available scientific evidence and the potential
confusion and inconsistency that may result with juries in fifty-two separate
jurisdictions imposing different standards concerning what constitutes
appropriate labeling.
All of these considerations may have been in the minds of the majority in
rendering the Wyeth decision. While the majority ruled that preemption did
not apply under the particular circumstances of that case, a fair reading of the
Court's decision leaves the door open to the continued application of the
preemption doctrine in other failure-to-warn cases. In particular, the Court's
decision appears to contemplate the continued application of the preemption
doctrine in cases in which the FDA has specifically considered the particular
risks that are the subject of a state-law tort suit. Accordingly, the Court may
soon be called upon to further articulate the standards for determining the
circumstances under which FDA action preempts state-law tort claims.
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE WYETH DECISION
A proper understanding of the Wyeth decision requires consideration of
the unique factual circumstances under which the case arose as well as the
8 Seeid. at 1199.
9 See, e.g., id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 1230 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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regulatory framework in which the preemption decision was made. The
federal government has had a long-standing role in the regulation of
pharmaceutical products, spanning over a century. Nonetheless, the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act (FDCA) does not expressly preempt state-law tort
claims. Rather, the Court has found that there is an implied preemption
where FDA regulation is implicated. In Wyeth, this doctrine ran up against a
very sympathetic set of circumstances, in which the plaintiff suffered
significant injuries based on the use of a method, the risks of which she
claimed had not been fully considered, if considered at all, by the FDA in
approving the drug decades earlier.
A. The History of Federal Regulation of Pharmaceutical Products
The federal government has had a long-standing role in the regulation of
pharmaceutical products. In 1906, Congress passed the Pure Food and Drug
Act, which sought to prevent the manufacture and interstate shipment of
adulterated or misbranded pharmaceutical products. 10 Three decades later,
Congress passed another statute, the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which
was broader in scope and required the approval of drugs by the federal
government before they were placed on the market to ensure that they were
safe if used according to their labeling." Congress amended the FDCA in
1962, placing the burden of proof on the manufacturer to determine that a
pharmaceutical product was safe for use according to the proposed labeling
and that the drug was in fact effective if used according to the labeling. 12 In
passing such measures, Congress sought to "assure the safety, effectiveness,
and reliability of drugs" before they were placed on the market. 13 Most
recently, Congress again amended the FDCA in 2007 to expand the FDA's
authority. Among other things, it authorized the FDA to require
manufacturers to change their labeling based on safety information that
emerges after a pharmaceutical product's initial approval and to conduct
additional post-approval studies. 14
10 See Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768, 768 (1906).
!1 See Food, Drug and, Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040,
1052 (1938).
12 See Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, §§ 102(d)9, 104(b), 76 Stat.
780, 781,784.
13 Id. at 780.
14 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85,
§ 901(a), 121 Stat. 823, 924-26.
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B. The Regulatory Framework
In order for a pharmaceutical product to receive FDA approval, a
manufacturer must submit a New Drug Application that contains information
regarding the benefits and risks associated with the product.15 The NDA
must contain "full reports of investigations which have been made to show
whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in
use," 16 the labeling the manufacturer proposes for the pharmaceutical, "a
discussion of why the benefits [of the pharmaceutical product] exceed the
risks" under "the conditions stated in the labeling," 17 and "any other data or
information relevant to an evaluation of the safety and effectiveness of the
drug product obtained or otherwise received by the applicant from any
source." 18 The FDA then undertakes a detailed review of the submitted
material in order to determine whether the drug is "safe for use under the
conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling,"
whether there is "substantial evidence that the drug will have the effect it
purports or is represented to have under the conditions of use prescribed,
recommended, or suggested in the proposed labeling," and whether, "based
on a fair evaluation of all material facts, such labeling is false or misleading
in any particular." 19
The FDA must deny any application that does not "include adequate tests
by all methods reasonably applicable to show whether or not such drug is
safe for use under the conditions prescribed, recommended, or suggested in
the proposed labeling."20 In addition, the application must contain
"substantial evidence" to demonstrate a drug's efficacy, defined as follows:
"[S]ubstantial evidence" means evidence consisting of adequate and well-
controlled investigations, including clinical investigations, by experts
qualified by scientific training and experience to evaluate the effectiveness
of the drug involved, on the basis of which it could fairly and responsibly be
concluded by such experts that the drug will have the effect it purports or is
represented to have. 21
15 21 U.S.C. § 355(a) (2006); 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(b) (2009).
16 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(l)(A), (F) (2006).
17 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(viii) (2009).
18 Id. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv).
19 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).
20 Id. § 355(d)(1)(b); see also 21 C.F.R. § 314.125(b) (2009).
21 21 U.S.C. § 355(d).
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The FDA thus scrutinizes and approves the final labeling for all
pharmaceutical products using a rigorous evaluation process to ensure that
they are safe and effective if used according to the labeling. 22
In doing so, it balances the benefits and risks associated with a
pharmaceutical product and weighs the scientific data supporting the various
claims and warnings. This balancing is inherent in the FDA's mandate
because "virtually every drug or device poses dangers under certain
conditions." 23 Accordingly, the FDA "generally considers a drug safe when
the expected therapeutic gain justifies the risk entailed by its use."'24 The
FDA likewise "is required to exercise its scientific judgment to determine the
kind and quantity of data and information an applicant is required to provide
for a particular drug to meet the statutory standards. '25 Moreover, where it
deems it appropriate, it may require manufacturers to conduct post-marketing
studies to collect additional information regarding "risks, benefits, and
optimal use."'26 Finally, the FDA crafts labeling in order to reach an
appropriate balance between the risks and benefits of the particular
pharmaceutical product.27 In doing so, it requires a warning where there is
"reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with the drug."'28
22 In addition to review by its own team of experts, the FDA may also consult with
independent scientific experts. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(n) (2006). Such expert advisory
panels must include individuals "qualified by training and experience to evaluate the
safety and effectiveness of the drugs" under review and must, "to the extent feasible,
possess skill and experience in the development, manufacturer, or utilization of such
drugs." Id. § 355(n)(3). The FDA strives to select individuals with "diverse expertise in
such fields as clinical and administrative medicine, pharmacy, pharmacology,
pharmacoeconomics, biological and physical sciences, and other related professions." Id.
23 FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 142 (2000); see also
Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (observing that the FDA must
often decide "[h]ow many more lives will be saved by a [pharmaceutical product] which,
along with its greater effectiveness, brings a greater risk of harm"); United States v.
Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 555 (1979) ("Few if any drugs are completely safe in the sense
that they may be taken by all persons in all circumstances without risk.").
24 Rutherford, 442 U.S. at 555.
25 21 C.F.R. § 314.105(c) (2009).
26 21 C.F.R. § 312.85 (2009).
27 See 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7470 (Feb. 22, 1985) ("Drug labeling serves as the
standard under which FDA determines whether a product is safe and effective."); see also
21 C.F.R. § 201.56(a) (2009) ("[L]abeling must contain a summary of the essential
scientific information needed for the safe and effective use of the drug[;] labeling must be
informative and accurate and neither promotional in tone nor false or misleading in any
particular[;] labeling must be based whenever possible on data derived from human
experience.").
28 21 C.F.R. § 201.80(e) (2009).
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After the initial approval, the FDA continues to monitor the safety and
effectiveness of approved drugs.29 Manufacturers have a continuing
obligation to report adverse events experienced by individuals taking the
drug.30 Adverse events that are "serious" and "unexpected" must be reported
to the FDA "as soon as possible but in no case later than 15 calendar days of
initial receipt of the information by the applicant."'31 The FDA also requires
the submission of periodic postmarketing reports on a quarterly and annual
basis discussing adverse events as well as all "significant new
information... that might affect the safety, effectiveness, or labeling of the
drug."'32 The FDA "shall" withdraw approval of a drug if it finds that it is not
safe when used in accordance with the labeling.33
In recognition that the scientific understanding of a drug's benefits and
risks may change over time, the applicable statutes and regulations
contemplate that the FDA may approve changes to the initial labeling.
Accordingly, applicants may submit a Supplemental New Drug Application
for consideration by the FDA in the event that they believe that changes in
the labeling are warranted. 34 FDA regulations also allow manufacturers to
alter a product's label without prior approval by the agency under certain
circumstances. The FDA's "changes being effected" (CBE) regulation states
that changes may be made to the labeling without FDA approval to
strengthen the warnings or instructions regarding dosage and administration:
(6) The agency may designate a category of changes for the purpose of
providing that, in the case of a change in such category, the holder of an
approved application may commence distribution of the drug product
involved upon receipt by the agency of a supplement for the change. These
changes include, but are not limited to:
(iii) Changes in the labeling.. . to accomplish any of the following:
2 9 See FDA, POSTMARKETING SURVEILLANCE PROGRAMS (2009),
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Surveillance/ucm
090385.htm.
30 21 C.F.R. § 314.80(c) (2009).
31 Id. § 314.80(c)(1)(i).
32 Id. §§ 314.80(c)(2), 314.81(b)(2)(i).
13 21 U.S.C. § 355(e) (2006) (noting that FDA may withdraw approval if "on the
basis of new information... the labeling of such drug, based on a fair evaluation of all
material facts, is false or misleading in any particular and was not corrected within a
reasonable time after receipt of written notice from the [FDA] specifying the matter
complained of').
34 See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(b)(2)(v)(A) (2009); FDA, supra note 29.
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(A) To add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or adverse
reaction;
(C) To add or strengthen an instruction about dosage and administration that
is intended to increase the safe use of the drug product .... 35
The rationale behind this provision seems to be that manufacturers should not
be forced to wait for FDA approval before providing additional information
regarding the potential risks associated with a pharmaceutical product.
However, such changes are ultimately subject to FDA review and approval. 36
The FDA had issued a series of statements over time suggesting that its
approval of drug labeling did not automatically have an across-the-board
preemptive effect. In 1974, for example, the FDA acknowledged the
existence of parallel state-law tort litigation in regulations designed to
maintain the confidentially of adverse drug reaction reports.37 In 1979, for
example, the FDA stated that "[i]t is not the intent of the FDA to influence
the civil tort liability of the manufacturer. '38 In 1994, it stated that "product
liability plays an important role in consumer protection. ' 39 And, in 1998, it
stated that it did not intend "to preclude the states from imposing additional
labeling requirements. '40
Likewise, there had been intermittent statements by Congress that
opponents of preemption had cited to suggest that Congress did not intend
that the FDCA have a preemptive effect. Thus, for example, in the
amendments to the FDCA enacted in 1962, Congress included a clause
stating that "[n]othing in the amendments made by this Act to the Federal
35 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c) (2009).
36 As one former FDA Chief Counsel has observed, such requirements mean that
"[t]he actual freedom of manufacturers unilaterally to change the packet insert is
minimal." Richard M. Cooper, Drug Labeling and Products Liability: The Role of the
Food and Drug Administration, 41 FOOD DRUG COSM. L.J. 233, 236 (1986). Other FDA
counsel have maintained that Congress "did not intend to preempt state tort remedies for
injury to individual consumers." Margaret J. Porter, The Lohr Decision: FDA Perspective
and Position, 52 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 7, 9 (1997); see also id. at 11 (maintaining that "FDA
product approval and state tort liability usually operate independently, each providing a
significant, yet distinct, layer of consumer protection").
37 See Food and Drug Administration: Public Information, 39 Fed. Reg. 44601,
44602 (Dec. 24, 1974).
38 Labeling and Prescription Drug Advertising; Content and Format for Labeling for
Human Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37434, 37437 (June 26, 1979).
39 Protecting the Identities of Reporters of Adverse Events and Patients; Preemption
of Disclosure Rules, 59 Fed. Reg. 3944, 3948 (Jan. 27, 1994).
40 Prescription Drug Product Labeling, 63 Fed. Reg. 66378, 66384 (Dec. 1, 1998).
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Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act shall be construed as invalidating any
provision of State law ... unless there is a direct and positive conflict
between such amendments and such provision of State law."4 1
However, in 2006, while the Wyeth litigation was still pending, the FDA
issued a new statement on preemption that arguably marked a shift in course
for the agency.42 The FDA maintained that state failure-to-warn claims posed
an obstacle to the agency's enforcement of the FDA's labeling requirements:
"FDA believes that under existing preemption principles, FDA approval of
labeling under the act, whether it be in the old or new format, preempts
conflicting or contrary State law."43 In addition, the FDA took the position
41 Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, § 202, 76 Stat. 780, 793 (1962).
42 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drug
and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922 (Jan. 24, 2006) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pts. 201, 314 & 601). For a critique of the FDA's regulation, see David A. Kessler &
David C. Vladek, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts to Preempt Failure-to-
Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. 461 (2008).
43 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. More specifically, the FDA regulation stated:
FDA believes that at least the following claims would be preempted by its
regulation of prescription drug labeling: (1) Claims that a drug sponsor breached an
obligation to warn by failing to put in Highlights or otherwise emphasize any
information the substance of which appears anywhere in the labeling; (2) claims that
a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to include in an
advertisement any information the substance of which appears anywhere in the
labeling, in those cases where a drug's sponsor has used Highlights consistently with
FDA draft guidance regarding the "brief summary" in direct-to-consumer
advertising... ; (3) claims that a sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing
to include contraindications or warnings that are not supported by evidence that
meets the standards set forth in this rule, including § 201.57(c)(5) (requiring that
contraindications reflect "[k]nown hazards and not theoretical possibilities") and
(c)(7); (4) claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to
include a statement in labeling or in advertising, the substance of which had been
proposed to FDA for inclusion in labeling, if that statement was not required by
FDA at the time plaintiff claims the sponsor had an obligation to warn (unless FDA
has made a finding that the sponsor withheld material information relating to the
proposed warning before plaintiff claims the sponsor had the obligation to warn); (5)
claims that a drug sponsor breached an obligation to warn by failing to include in
labeling or in advertising a statement the substance of which FDA has prohibited in
labeling or advertising; and (6) claims that a drug's sponsor breached an obligation
to plaintiff by making statements that FDA approved for inclusion in the drug's
label (unless FDA has made a finding that the sponsor withheld material information
relating to the statement).
Id. at 3935-36.
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that "[s]tate law actions also threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the
expert Federal agency responsible for evaluating and regulating drugs." 44
As the FDA explained, its role in evaluating new drugs to determine their
safety and efficacy was comprehensive. "Under the act, FDA is the expert
Federal public health agency charged by Congress with ensuring that drugs
are safe and effective, and that their labeling adequately informs users of the
risks and benefits of the product and is truthful and not misleading." 45 It
noted that in approving a new drug, the agency undertakes "a comprehensive
scientific evaluation of the product's risks and benefits under the conditions
of use prescribed, recommended, or suggested in the labeling."'46 The "FDA
considers not only complex clinical issues related to the use of the product in
study populations, but also important and practical public health issues
pertaining to the use of the product in day-to-day clinical practice. '47 In
particular, the FDA noted its careful attention to a product's labeling: "The
centerpiece of risk management for prescription drugs generally is the
labeling which reflects thorough FDA review of the pertinent scientific
evidence and communicates to health care practitioners the agency's formal,
authoritative conclusions regarding the conditions under which the product
can be used safely and effectively." 48
The FDA further noted that parallel state litigation could significantly
interfere with the FDA's mission. As the FDA explained:
State law actions... threaten FDA's statutorily prescribed role as the
expert Federal agency responsible for evaluating and regulating drugs. State
actions are not characterized by centralized expert evaluation of drug
regulatory issues. Instead, they encourage, and in fact require, lay judges
and juries to second-guess the assessment of benefits versus risks of a
specific drug to the general public-the central role of FDA-sometimes on
behalf of a single individual or group of individuals. That individualized
reevaluation of the benefits and risks of a product can result in relief-
including the threat of significant damage awards or penalties-that creates
pressure on manufacturers to attempt to add wamings that FDA has neither
44 Id. at 3935.
45 Id. at 3934.
4 6 Id.
47 Id.
48 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. The FDA noted that it "carefully controls the content of
labeling for a prescription drug, because such labeling is FDA's principal tool for
educating health care professionals about the risks and benefits of the approved product
to help ensure safe and effective use." Id. "FDA continuously works to evaluate the latest
available scientific information to monitor the safety of products and to incorporate
information into the product's labeling when appropriate." Id.
1444 [Vol. 70:6
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approved nor found to be scientifically required. This could encourage
manufacturers to propose "defensive labeling" to avoid State liability,
which, if implemented, could result in scientifically unsubstantiated
warnings and underutilization of beneficial treatments.49
Among other things, the FDA concluded that state tort suits could "erode
and disrupt the careful and truthful representation of benefits and risks that
prescribers need to make appropriate judgments about drug use." 50 In
addition, they could "creat[e] pressure on manufacturers to expand labeling
warnings to include speculative risks and, thus, to limit physician
appreciation of potentially far more significant contraindications and side
effects." 5 1 Finally, they could "discourag[e] safe and effective use of
approved products or encourag[e] inappropriate use." 52 The FDA maintained
that there were "several instances in which product liability lawsuits have
directly threatened the agency's ability to regulate manufacturer
dissemination of risk information for prescription drugs." 53
C. The Trial Record
As the dissenters in Wyeth observed, the facts in the litigation plainly
engendered sympathy for the plaintiff. Diana Levine had been treated for
nausea following a migraine headache by a physician's assistant who
administered Phenergan first via intramuscular injection and, after that failed
to provide relief, using a "butterfly" intravenous infusion set, following a
procedure known as "IV push" administration. 54 As a result of this treatment,
she suffered extensive damage to her arm, which became gangrenous and
had to be amputated at the elbow.55 Plaintiff brought suit in Vermont state
court alleging that defendant Wyeth had failed to appropriately warn of the
hazards of intravenous injection of Phenergan, and after a five-day trial, a
jury awarded her a verdict for $7,400,000, which was adjusted downward to
$6,774,000.56
49 Id. at 3935.
50 Id.
51 Id.
52 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935 ("Exaggeration of risk could discourage appropriate use of a
beneficial drug.").
53 Id. at 3934.
54 Levine v. Am. Home Prods., Inc., No. 670-12-01, 2004 WL 5456809, at *1 (Vt.
Super. Ct. July 30, 2004).
55 Id.
56 Id.
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The evidence presented at trial indicated that there were essentially three
methods for administering Phenergan: deep muscular injection, through a
free-flowing IV bag, or through direct intravenous administration (the
method used with plaintiff).57 Deep muscular injection and IV bag
administration were shown to be less risky because the chance of
accidentally administering Phenergan into an artery, which could lead to
"catastrophic" tissue damage,58 is significantly reduced. Deep muscular
injection largely avoids the arteries that could prove dangerous if
accidentally accessed during administration. Administration through an IV
bag drip is less risky because it is easier to determine if an artery has
accidentally been tapped. Moreover, because there is back pressure from the
patient, the IV solution containing Phenergan cannot flow into an artery. 59
Given these alternative methods of administration, plaintiff argued that
the direct intravenous method of administration should be strongly
discouraged in the label or, at a minimum, should be accompanied with more
significant warnings. 60 The Phenergan label was not silent on this topic.
Since 1976, it had contained a warning about the hazards of intra-arterial
57 Id.
58 Id. at *2 (finding that when Phenergan is injected into arteries, "[t]he patient
suffers spasm of the arteries, inflammation, loss of blood flow due to clotting, gangrene,
and, in some cases, the loss of a limb or other serious injury" and that "[o]nce Phenergan
enters the arterial flow, there is no reliable way to reverse the harmful effects of the
medication on the tiny vessels distal (downstream) from the site of the injection"). Based
on the evidence introduced at trial, the means by which Phenergan entered plaintiff's
arteries was "unclear." Id. There was a possibility that the drug was administered
"directly" into an artery or that the drug "leaked out of the vein and entered an artery
through a process called extravasation." Levine, 2004 WL 5456809, at *2.
59 Id. There was disagreement during the trial concerning whether the specific
method of administration used in plaintiff's case was actually the less risky IV method or,
rather, should be classified as a direct intravenous administration method. For example,
defendant's expert testified that "the butterfly infusion set could be considered to be a
form of free-flowing IV administration." Id. at *3. However, plaintiff's expert disagreed.
See id.
60 Id. at * 1. For example, plaintiff's expert testified that "there was little medical
justification for administration of Phenergan intravenously because of the availability of
an intramuscular injection" and that "[i]f a physician chose intravenous administration of
the drug, the use of a free-flowing IV bag would be safer than injection through a
butterfly infusion set." Id. at *3. He concluded that "the warnings and instructions on the
Phenergan label at the time of plaintiff's injury were inadequate to make the product safe
because the defendant did not warn sufficiently of the risk of intravenous injection."
Levine, 2004 WL 5456809, at *3; see also Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt.
2008).
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injection.6 1 However, it did not specifically contain a warning or instruction
"concerning the preferred use of an intravenous infusion set" for
administration of the drug.62
In subsequent years, there were some proposals for revision of the label.
However, the issue of intra-arterial injection came up only intermittently and
does not appear to have been the subject of extensive discussion with the
FDA. For example, an FDA advisory committee recommended in 1976 that
the following warning be added: "If a Tubex system is used for intravenous
injection, the drug should be injected into a satisfactorily functioning
intravenous set."'63 In 1981 and 1988, defendant proposed changing the
package insert to contain the following language, which it submitted in
conjunction with other proposed labeling changes: "When administering any
irritant drug intravenously, it is usually preferable to inject it through the
tubing of an intravenous infusion set that is known to be functioning
satisfactorily." 64 However, this revised wording was not used. Finally, in
61 Levine, 2004 WL 5456809, at *2. The FDA originally approved Phenergan in
1955. See Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1191 (2009). In Wyeth, the Court noted the
text of the 2000 version of the label:
Due to the close proximity of arteries and veins in the areas most commonly used
for intravenous injection, extreme care should be exercised to avoid perivascular
extravasation or inadvertent intra-arterial injection. Reports compatible with
inadvertent intra-arterial injection of Phenergan Injection, usually in conjunction
with other drugs intended for intravenous use, suggest that pain, severe chemical
irritation, severe spasm of distal vessels, and resultant gangrene requiring
amputation are likely under such circumstances. Intravenous injection was intended
in all the cases reported but perivascular extravasation or arterial placement of the
needle is now suspect. There is no proven successful management of this condition
after it occurs.... Aspiration of dark blood does not preclude intra-arterial needle
placement, because blood is discolored upon contract with Phenergan Injection. Use
of syringes with rigid plungers or of small bore needles might obscure typical
arterial backflow if this is relied upon alone.... Phenergan Injection should be
given in a concentration no greater than 25 mg per mL and at a rate not to exceed 25
mg per minute. When administering any irritant drug intravenously it is usually
preferable to inject it through the tubing of an intravenous infusion set that is known
to be functioning satisfactorily. In the event that a patient complains of pain during
intended intravenous injection of Phenergan Injection, the injection should be
stopped immediately to provide for evaluation of possible arterial placement or
perivascular extravasation.
Id. at 1191 n.1.
6 2 Levine, 2004 WL 5456809, at *3.
63 Id.
64 Id. The Vermont Supreme Court identified the following provisions in the
warning as relevant to the preemption analysis:
2009] 1447
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
1997, the FDA directed defendant to "retain verbiage in [the] current label"
regarding intra-arterial injection and apparently rejected the language that
defendant had proposed in 1981 and 1988.65
D. The Trial Court's Analysis
The Vermont trial court found that this evidence did not establish a
sound case for preemption, and denied defendant's motion for summary
judgment and post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law.66 In
summarizing this evidence, the court characterized it as demonstrating at
most that the FDA gave the issue of whether IV infusion should be used to
administer Phenergan only "passing attention:"
The evidence in this case is that a concern about inadvertent intra-arterial
injection surfaced by 1979 and was the subject of a relatively mild warning
proposed by the defendant in 1981 and again in 1988. The FDA rejected the
proposed labeling change 9 years later in 1997 in a brief comment. There is
no evidence in this record that either the FDA or the manufacturer gave
more than passing attention to the issue of whether to use an IV infusion to
administer the drug. The proposed labeling change did not address the use
of a free-flowing IV bag. Viewing the matter in hindsight through the lens
of a single catastrophic case, this Court heard little evidence that the FDA
reviewed the issue of the intravenous administration of Phenergan with
scientific rigor or any sense of urgency. 67
INADVERTENT INTRA-ARTERIAL INJECTION: There are reports of necrosis
leading to gangrene, requiring amputation, following injection of [Phenergan],
usually in conjunction with other drugs; the intravenous route was intended in these
cases, but arterial or partial arterial placement of the needle is now suspect....
There is no established treatment other than prevention:
1. Beware of the close proximity of arteries and veins at commonly used injection
sites and consider the possibility of aberrant arteries.
2. When used intravenously, [Phenergan] should be given in a concentration no
greater than 25 mg/mI and a rate not to exceed 25 mg/minute. Injection through a
properly running intravenous infusion may enhance the possibility of detecting
arterial placement. In addition, this results in delivery of a lower concentration of
any arteriolar irritant.
Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 183 n.1 (emphasis omitted).
65 Levine, 2004 WL 5456809, at *3.
66 Id. at* 11.
67 Id. at *6.
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Accordingly, the court concluded that "[t]he record in this case does not
indicate that the work of the FDA has been obstructed by the potential
exposure of the manufacturer to state law tort liability. 68
As is shown from the foregoing discussion, the court highlighted several
aspects of the record in coming to this conclusion. First, there was a lack of
evidence that the specific issue that was the subject of the controversy was
actually raised with the FDA.69 The important issue in terms of the state-law
tort suit was whether there could have been a stronger warning regarding use
of IV-bag administration as the preferred means of administration compared
with intravenous administration. The court did not find evidence that the
FDA specifically considered this issue.70 Moreover, it did not find strong
evidence that the defendant manufacturer directly raised this issue with the
FDA given the "relatively mild" nature of the warning contained in the
proposed language submitted in 1981 and 1988. 71 Second, the court noted the
limited nature of the FDA's reaction to what had been submitted. The FDA
did not take any action on the matter until nearly a decade later and then only
dispensed with the proposed language in a cursory reference that did not, in
the court's view, present any evidence that the FDA had actually considered
the issue that came up in the state lawsuit.72
The trial court specifically contrasted this record with the record before
the FDA in another case that had been cited by the parties involving medical
devices. There, the FDA fiad engaged in "a comprehensive pre-market
approval process" requiring "an average of 1,200 hours of review time by the
agency, thousands of pages of documentation, and substantial give-and-take
between the agency and the manufacturer." 73 The court found this contrast
significant:
That is a very different process from the leisurely course of review for the
Phenergan label changes conducted over some sixteen years. The regulatory
process in this case was marked by long periods of dormancy and a
conclusory decision in 1997 to require no change to the existing label. The
recommendation of administration through a free-flowing IV bag never
appears in the regulatory record. 74
68 Id.
69 See id.
70 See id.
71 Levine, 2004 WL 5456809, at *6.
72 See id.
73 Id.
74 Id. at *6-7.
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"In short, a tort case is unlikely to obstruct the regulatory process when the
record shows that the FDA has paid very little attention to the issues raised
by the parties at trial." 75
Indeed, the court questioned whether there even could have been any
reason that the FDA would not have ordered a stronger warning if it had
actually considered the issue. It found that there was no risk that "excessive
or unwarranted" rulings regarding "remote" side effects might reduce the use
of a safe and effective treatment because the question in the Phenergan case
"relates only to the method of administration" of the drug and "not to the
decision to use Phenergan" in the first instance. 76 It was thus much different
than the case of a pharmaceutical product where there was a question
concerning whether additional warnings should be provided. In such
circumstances, the court noted, the case for preemption was much stronger
given that "proposed warnings of remote side effects... might dissuade
physicians from using the drug to the detriment of the patient population. 77
E. The Vermont Supreme Court's Analysis
The Vermont Supreme Court agreed with the trial court that this was not
a particularly good case for application of the preemption doctrine. 78 On
appeal, defendant Wyeth crafted two primary theories in arguing that the
state tort suit conflicted with FDA actions.79 First, it maintained that there
was a conflict because the FDA was aware of the dangers of the IV-push
method of administration and yet had specifically ordered defendant to
continue using a label that lacked warnings that plaintiff maintained were
necessary to convey the risks.80 Second, defendant maintained that allowing
the state tort claims to proceed would present an obstacle to the purpose of
the FDA's labeling regulations by allowing juries in the various state
jurisdictions to impose different standards concerning the appropriate
warnings in the Phenergan label. 81
75 Id. at *7.
76 Id.
77 Levine, 2004 WL 5456809, at *7.
78 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006).
79 Id. at 185. Wyeth also asserted a related theory of field preemption, which it
subsequently abandoned. See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 n.5 (1990)
(observing that "field pre-emption may be understood as a species of conflict
preemption").
80 Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 185.
81 See id.
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Under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, "it has been settled that
state law that conflicts with federal law is 'without effect.' ' 82 This
requirement flows directly from the Supremacy Clause in Article IV of the
Constitution. 83 The doctrine of conflict preemption encompasses both
"'conflicts' that prevent or frustrate the accomplishment of a federal
objective" and "'conflicts' that make it 'impossible' for private parties to
comply with both state and federal law."'84 Defendant thus invoked both
prongs of the doctrine (as well as certain other preemption theories) in
challenging the state court judgment.
While the Chief Justice of that court filed a strong dissent, it was largely
based on his dispute of the majority's characterization of the plaintiffs
claims in the underlying lawsuit. Chief Justice Reiber argued that recovery
by the plaintiff would entail a refutation of the FDA's decision not to bar the
IV-push method of administration of Phenergan.85 The majority rejected this
contention, however, concluding that the only issue was the content of the
warnings in the Phenergan labeling and that the FDA record did not
demonstrate that the agency had thoroughly considered this issue in
approving the wording in the label.86
1. The Majority's Analysis
The majority's analysis relied heavily on the Changes Being Effected
regulation found in 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c), which it concluded "creates a
specific procedure allowing drug manufacturers to change labels that are
insufficient to protect consumers, despite their approval by the FDA,"
thereby allowing "manufacturers to avoid state failure-to-warn claims
82 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (quoting Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981)).
83 The Supremacy Clause provides that: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the
Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 540-41 (2001) (Supremacy Clause allows
Congress to "pre-empt[] state action in a particular area"); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n
v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 152 (1982) (preemption doctrine "has its roots in the
Supremacy Clause"); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 252 (2000)
("Under the Supremacy Clause, any obligation to disregard state law flows entirely from
the obligation to follow federal law.").
84 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 873-74 (2000).
85 See Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 197 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting).
86 See id. at 198.
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without violating federal law."87 Accordingly, in the majority's view, there
was no necessary conflict with FDA regulation or absolute prohibition on
state failure-to-warn claims. Rather, the analysis was more nuanced. The
court concluded that it must look at the specific record in the case to
determine whether it created an actual conflict between the FDA and the
state failure-to-warn lawsuit. 88
In doing so, it rejected a couple of arguments raised by the defendant in
support of its interpretation. First, it concluded that the Supreme Court's
decision in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal Committee89 was not controlling
because that decision held that so-called "fraud-on-the-FDA" claims were
preempted in a case involving medical devices. 90 The court distinguished that
decision on the ground that fraud-on-the-FDA claims did not fall within an
area of traditional state authority, whereas failure-to-warn claims did.91
Second, the Court rejected defendant's argument that Geier v. American
Honda Motor Co.92 compelled a contrary result. Geier involved a regulation
governing safety standards for automobiles. Defendant there successfully
argued that the federal regulations preempted state-law tort claims for failure
of manufacturers to produce automobiles without airbags.93 However, the
Vermont Supreme Court distinguished Geier on the ground that, in its view,
the regulation there was specifically designed to impose a ceiling, and not
merely a floor, for state regulation.94 The court noted that the record in Geier
indicated that "the Department of Transportation's intent in drafting the
regulation at issue was to provide a range of different safety options, thus
precluding any state determination that a specific type of equipment should
be required." 95 The court contrasted this with the FDA's regulations, which it
interpreted as specifically authorizing manufacturers to adopt more stringent
87 Id. at 185-86 (majority opinion).
88 See id. at 188 ("FDA approval of a particular label does not preempt a jury
finding that the label provided insufficient warning, as defendant was free under
§ 314.70(c) to strengthen the warning without prior FDA approval.").
89 531 U.S. 341, 341 (2001).
90 Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 187.
91 Id.
92 529 U.S. 861 (2000). For a discussion of Geier, see Richard C. Ausness,
Preemption of State Tort Law By Federal Safety Statutes: Supreme Court Preemption
Jurisprudence Since Cipollone, 92 KY. L.J. 913, 955-59 (2004); Alexander K. Haas,
Chipping Away at State Tort Remedies Through Pre-emption Jurisprudence: Geier v.
American Honda Motor Co., 89 CAL. L. REv. 1927 (2001).
93 See Geier, 529 U.S. at 861.
94 Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 188.
95 Id. at 187.
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warnings without FDA approval, thereby ruling out any possibility that state
failure-to-warn lawsuits were automatically preempted. 96
In so ruling, the Vermont Supreme Court specifically contrasted certain
decisions that had been issued in the litigation regarding the antidepressant
Zoloft. 97 There, the court observed, there had been "an FDA statement that
the warning advocated by the plaintiff would have been misleading. '98 Under
such circumstances, there was an actual conflict manifested in the record
between the state failure-to-warn claims and the FDA's action. Thus, the
court did not hold that failure-to-warn claims were never preempted, but
rather that they were not always preempted simply by virtue of the fact that
the FDA had approved a drug's labeling.
Applying these principles to the facts in Wyeth, the court found that the
record did not manifest an overt conflict between the FDA's action and the
state failure-to-warn claim. The court found, for example, that "[t]he record
lacks any evidence that the FDA was concerned that a stronger warning was
not supported by the facts, that such a stronger warning would distract
doctors from other provisions in the drug's label, or that the warning might
lead to less effective administration of the drug."99 Likewise, the court found
that while "Defendant has provided a number of letters exchanged by the
FDA and defendant regarding Phenergan's label," the letters "do not indicate
the FDA's opinion of the value of IV-push administration," or in particular
that "the FDA wished to preserve the use of IV push as a method of
administering Phenergan."' 00 This included defendant's assertion that the
FDA's rejection of its proposed labeling changes suggested that the FDA had
concluded that no further warnings regarding the NV-push method were
warranted:
The FDA could have rejected the new warning for any number of reasons,
including clarity or technical accuracy, without implicitly prohibiting a
stronger warning. Defendant's unsupported hypothesis that the FDA saw
the new warning as harmful seems among the least likely explanations, as
96 See id. at 188.
97 See id. at 186-87 (citing Needleman v. Pfizer, Inc., No. Civ. A. 3:03-CV-3074-N
2004 WL 1773697, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004)).
98 Id. at 187.
99 Id. at 188.
100 Wyeth, 944 A.2d. at 189.
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the rejected proposal would not have eliminated IV push as an option for
administering Phenergan. 1 1
Accordingly, based on the majority's view of the record, there was no
conflict between FDA action and the failure-to-warn claim, and thus no
preemption.
The majority rejected defendant's argument that the state lawsuit was
inconsistent with congressional purposes and objectives for similar
reasons. 10 2 The majority pointed to the 1962 amendments to the FDCA as
evidencing a congressional intent that state-law tort suits not be preempted in
every case, finding that "Congress intended that the FDCA would leave state
law in place except where it created a 'direct and positive conflict' between
state and federal law." 10 3 It held that this legislative statement defeated
defendant's allegation that state-law tort suits per se interfered with
congressional purposes and objectives given that Congress expressly
contemplated that there was room for the continued effect of state law in this
area. 1 4 While it noted the important concern that "permitting too much state
activity in this area will make beneficial drugs less available to
consumers," 10 5 it concluded that such policy concerns could not trump the
clear expression of congressional intent. Likewise, it concluded that the
FDA's recent statement on the preemptive effect of the FDCA could not
change what the court believed was the intent expressed by Congress:
Here, we are not attempting to infer the effect of statutory language that
only indirectly addresses the specific state law at issue. Instead, we are
interpreting an unambiguous express preemption clause that specifically
preserves the type of state law at issue. Under these circumstances, ordinary
preemption principles must give way to Congress's intent to preserve state
laws that do not create a "direct and positive conflict" with federal law.
Drug Amendments § 202. There is no such conflict here. Accordingly, the
FDA's statement is neither an authoritative interpretation of an ambiguous
statutory provision entitled to deference, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43,
101 Id. The majority also concluded that "the proposed warning was different, but
not stronger." Id. "It was also no longer or more prominent than the original warning, so
it could not have raised a concern that it might overshadow other warnings on the label or
drive doctors away from prescribing the drug." Id.
102 Id. at 190.
103 Id.
104 Wyeth, 944 A.2d at 191.
105 Id. at 191.
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104 S.Ct. 2778, nor a persuasive policy statement entitled to respect. Mead,
533 U.S. at 235, 121 S. Ct. 2164.106
According to the majority, the FDA did not adequately explain "the
inconsistency between its position and the language of the [congressional]
preemption amendment."107
2. The Dissent
Chief Justice Reiber issued a strong dissent, agreeing with defendants
that the state law claims were preempted based both on the existence of a
conflict with FDA regulation of Phenergan and also because they would
obstruct federal purposes and objectives. With respect to the first grounds for
preemption, Chief Justice Reiber maintained that plaintiffs lawsuit
essentially sought to eliminate a means of administration-IV-push
administration-that the FDA had expressly approved:
Specifically, the FDA approved IV administration of Phenergan and
required that IV administration be listed on the Phenergan label. By
contrast, plaintiff's theory of the case required Wyeth either to remove this
approved use from the Phenergan label, add a warning that would directly
contradict the label's indication that IV administration was a safe and
effective use, or, at a minimum, add a warning that only certain types of IV
administration should be used. Thus, compliance with state law in this case
would require Wyeth to eliminate uses of Phenergan approved by the FDA
and required to be included in the Phenergan labeling.10
8
106 Id. at 193-94. Accordingly, the Court concluded: "Nothing in the FDA's new
statement alters our conclusion that it would be possible for defendant to comply with
both its federal obligations and the obligations of state common law." Id. at 193.
107 Id. at 193.
108 Id. at 197 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting). The dissent further stated:
The majority in essence concludes that it is not impossible for Wyeth to comply
with both federal and state standards because Wyeth never sought FDA approval of
a "stronger warning" of the type advocated by plaintiff. According to the majority,
because the FDA was not presented with, and therefore did not explicitly reject,
such strengthened language, there is no reason to presume that the FDA would
disapprove. Therefore, the majority reasons, there is no actual conflict between state
and federal law .... It is inaccurate, however, to characterize the requirements
imposed by the jury verdict in this case as merely requiring a "stronger warning."
Rather, what plaintiff sought was an elimination of a use of Phenergan that had been
approved by the FDA. Furthermore, the FDA's rejection of Wyeth's efforts to alter
14552009]
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Accordingly, there was a direct conflict between the state lawsuit and FDA
regulation. This view of the nature of the plaintiff's claim rendered the
FDA's CBE regulation largely irrelevant given that, under Section 314.70(c),
"a manufacturer may change a label only to add or strengthen a warning, not
to eliminate an approved use." 109
For similar reasons, Chief Justice Reiber found that the state lawsuit
would impose obstacles to federal purposes and objectives because it would
essentially vitiate the FDA's approval of a particular means of drug
administration:
In short, by approving Phenergan for marketing and distribution, the FDA
concluded that the drug-with its approved methods of administration and
as labeled-was both safe and effective.... In finding defendant liable for
failure to warn, a Vermont jury concluded that the same drug-with its
approved methods of administration and as labeled-was "unreasonably
dangerous.".. .These two conclusions are in direct conflict.110
The dissent rejected the notion that the 1962 "preemption amendment"
barred this theory, arguing that its language regarding "direct and positive
conflict[s]" did not have anything to do with "the 'obstacle' prong of the
actual conflict preemption standard."'11 Rather, it believed that the case was
similar to the situation the Supreme Court addressed in Geier, reasoning that,
"[a]s with the DOT in Geier, the FDA is primarily concerned with public
safety" and that in approving drug labeling "the FDA balances its assessment
of a drug's safety against concerns for the drug's efficacy, taking into
account that a safer but less effective drug is not necessarily best for the
public health overall. '1 12
the language of the warning in 2000 supports Wyeth's claim that the FDA had an
affirmative preference for the language of the original warning.
Wyeth, 944 A.2d. at 197-98 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting).
109 Id. at 199. The dissent also argued that "the regulation does not allow
manufacturers to simply reassess and draw different conclusions regarding the same risks
and benefits already balanced by the FDA" and that "[h]ere, the FDA had already
evaluated the risk of inadvertent arterial injection from direct IV administration of
Phenergan, and had mandated warning language for the label to reflect that risk
assessment." Id. In addition, the dissent argued that "any change accomplished under
§ 314.70(c) is subject to ultimate FDA review and approval." Id.
110 Id. at 197 (citation omitted).
I I ld. at 201.
112 Wyeth, 944 A.2d. at 202-03 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting).
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State tort lawsuits would interfere with such reasoned decision making
and balancing of competing considerations regarding what to include and
what to exclude in pharmaceutical product labeling. As the dissent explained:
No drug is without risks. The FDA balances the risks of a drug against
its benefits to maximize the availability of beneficial treatments. The FDA's
decision in approving a drug, its uses and labeling reflect consideration of
these and other policy factors. While a state-court jury presumably shares
the FDA's concern that drugs on the market be reasonably safe, the jury
does not assess reasonableness in the context of public health and the
associated risk-benefit analysis. A jury does not engage in a measured and
multi-faceted policy analysis. Rather, a jury views the safety of the drug
through the lens of a single patient who has already been catastrophically
injured. Such an approach is virtually guaranteed to provide different
conclusions in different courts about what is "reasonably safe" than the
balancing approach taken by the FDA. In fact, different conclusions were
reached in this case. 113
The dissent concluded that the jury's verdict "conflict[ed] squarely with the
FDA's assessment of precisely the same issue" and thereby frustrated the
reasoned federal process that was designed to resolve such questions.114
Thus, there was a fundamental disagreement between the dissent and the
majority that was largely based on how plaintiffs claims were characterized.
While the majority viewed this as a straightforward failure-to-warn case, the
dissent found that "[t]he crux of plaintiff's claim was not based on the label
warnings per se, but on the approved uses listed there." 115 Largely, this
dispute turned on whether the FDA's references to "IV administration"
meant that it had specifically considered the safety and effectiveness of IV-
push administration, or whether this generic term merely referred to all forms
of IV administration, including the IV-drip administration that plaintiff
argued was a safer means of administration.' 16
113 Id. at 203 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting).
114Id.
115 Id. at 198. As the dissent further observed: "At its core, plaintiffs argument in
this case was not that the warnings on the label were inadequate, but that an approved use
(direct IV administration) was in fact unreasonably unsafe. Plaintiff did not seek to 'add
or strengthen' a warning or a dosage/administration instruction, but rather to eliminate an
approved use of the drug." Id. at 200.
116 In rejecting the assertion that the lawsuit sought to ban a method of
administration that had been specifically approved by the FDA, the majority reasoned as
follows:
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II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION
To the surprise of many, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
Vermont Supreme Court's ruling. Nonetheless, it suggested that its ruling
was a "narrow" one that was limited to its specific facts. 1 7 Moreover, both
the majority and Justice Breyer's concurrence suggested ways in which the
preemption doctrine may serve an important role in future cases with
stronger facts demonstrating an actual conflict between state tort claims and
FDA regulation of pharmaceutical products.
A. The Majority Opinion
The majority in Wyeth adopted the premise of the majority opinion
issued by the Vermont Supreme Court-i.e., that the Vermont jury verdict
against Wyeth did not require the contraindication of IV-push administration
of Phenergan, but rather only found that the warning was insufficient in some
manner. 118 It likewise relied heavily on the CBE regulations in concluding
that FDA regulation did not conflict with the state-law tort claims. While it
recognized that "the FDA retains authority to reject labeling changes made
pursuant to the CBE regulation in its review of the manufacturer's
The dissent appears to interpret any warning that would eliminate IV-push
administration as inherently inconsistent with the FDA's approval of Phenergan for
IV administration in general. We see no such inconsistency, as an approval of a drug
for IV administration is not the same as a conclusion that all methods of IV
administration are safe. In any case, a jury verdict in a failure-to-warn case simply
establishes that the relevant warning was insufficient; it does not mandate a
particular replacement warning.
Id. at 189 n.2 (majority opinion). In contrast, the dissent stated:
Here, the FDA clearly addressed the risks attending IV administration of the
drug. The label approved IV administration generally, and specifically warned of the
dangers of direct IV administration, including inadvertent arterial injection possibly
resulting in amputation. In light of this, it cannot be argued that the FDA did not (1)
assess the risk of IV administration, including direct IV administration and the
associated risk of amputation due to inadvertent arterial injection; (2) conclude that
the benefits of allowing IV administration with appropriate warnings outweighed the
risk; and (3) reach a decision regarding precisely what warning language should be
used.
Wyeth, 944 A.2d. at 198 (Reiber, C.J., dissenting).
117 Wyeth v. Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1194 (2009) ("The narrower question
presented is whether federal law pre-empts Levine's claim that Phenergan's label did not
contain an adequate warning about using the IV-push method of administration.").
118 Id
1458 [Vol. 70:6
PREEMPTION AFTER WYETH
supplemental application,"1 19 nonetheless, manufacturers remained free to
strengthen the warnings in the labeling in the first instance. Accordingly, the
Court held that "absent clear evidence that the FDA would not have
approved a change to Phenergan's label, we will not conclude that it was
impossible for Wyeth to comply with both federal and state requirements.' 120
The majority found that there was "no such evidence" in the record
before it. 121 The Court observed that while Wyeth had argued that the FDA
had in fact considered the need for strengthened warnings regarding the IV-
push method of administration, "both the trial court and the Vermont
Supreme Court rejected this account as a matter of fact," finding "no
evidence in this record that either the FDA or the manufacturer gave more
than passing attention to the issue of IV-push versus IV-drip
administration." 122 In particular, the majority rejected the notion that the
FDA's rejection of the 1988 warning constituted consideration of the
particular risks at issue in the Vermont lawsuit. The majority observed that
"the trial court and the Vermont Supreme Court found that the 1988 warning
did not differ in any material respect from the FDA-approved warning"'123
and found that "the United States concedes that the FDA did not regard the
proposed warning as substantively different."'1 24 Indeed, the majority found
that "Wyeth does not argue that it supplied the FDA with an evaluation or
analysis concerning the specific dangers posed by the IV-push method."'125
Thus, because there had been no consideration of the particular risks that
were at issue in the state lawsuit, as a matter of fact, there could be no
conflict between the FDA's action and the outcome of that lawsuit, and thus,
in the majority's opinion, no preemption. As the majority explained, "the
mere fact that the FDA approved Phenergan's label" was insufficient to
establish preemption:
On the record before us, Wyeth has failed to demonstrate that it was
impossible for it to comply with both federal and state requirements. The
CBE regulation permitted Wyeth to unilaterally strengthen its warning, and
119 Id. at 1198.
120 Id.
121lId.
122 Id. at 1198-99 (internal quotes omitted).
123 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1199 n.5 (citing Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 189 (Vt. 2006)).
124 Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
25, Wyeth v. Levine, No. 06-1249 (U.S. 2009)).
125 Id. at 1199. The Court therefore found that it "cannot credit Wyeth's contention
that the FDA would have prevented it from adding a stronger warning about the IV-push
method of intravenous administration." Id.
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the mere fact that the FDA approved Phenergan's label does not establish
that it would have prohibited such a change. 12 6
The test applied by the Court thus requires a far more fact-intensive analysis
regarding the actual record regarding a pharmaceutical's approval and
subsequent review by the FDA.
The majority was more firm in rejecting Wyeth's second theory that
state-law failure-to-warn claims would obstruct the purposes and objectives
of federal drug labeling regulation. The Court concluded that congressional
intent was to the contrary, given that Congress had never expressly
preempted state-law tort suits, as it had in the context of medical devices.127
In addition, it rejected Wyeth's reliance on the 2006 FDA regulation,
concluding that it did not "merit deference," given that the agency finalized
its rule "without offering States or other interested parties notice or
opportunity for comment," which the Court believed rendered the regulation
"inherently suspect."'1 28 It thus contrasted the situation with that in Geier,
which it found to be "quite different" because in that case the Department of
Transportation had conducted a "formal rulemaking." 129 Moreover, the
majority concluded that the regulations were inconsistent with its view of the
congressional record, which it concluded manifested no intent to impose an
across-the-board rule of preemption of state failure-to-warn claims.130
126 Id.
127 Id. at 1200 (citing Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a)
(2006)). The majority noted that congressional "silence on the issue, coupled with its
certain awareness of the prevalence of state tort litigation, is powerful evidence that
Congress did not intend FDA oversight to be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety
and effectiveness." Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1200. The express preemption provision of the
Medical Device Amendments to the FDCA states as follows:
[No State... may establish or continue in effect with respect to a device intended
for human use any requirement---( 1) which is different from, or in addition to, any
requirement applicable under this chapter to the device, and (2) which relates to the
safety or effectiveness of the device or to any other matter included in a requirement
applicable to the device under this chapter.
21 U.S.C. § 360k(a).
128 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1201.
129. at 1203 (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 875, 879, 881). The Court also found the
amicus brief filed by the U.S. government in support of Wyeth's position was
"undeserving of deference" because it was inconsistent with prior "understanding" of the
scope of the preemptive effect of its regulations. See id. at 1203 n. 13.
130 See id. at 1200-04. The majority also noted that the 2006 FDA statement
"represents a dramatic change in position," id. at 1203, and "reverses the FDA's own
longstanding position without providing a reasoned explanation, including any discussion
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However, the Court inferred this congressional intent largely through
congressional silence, noting that Congress had not chosen to expressly
preempt state failure-to-warn lawsuits. 13 1 Moreover, it further noted that
"some state-law claims might well frustrate the achievement of congressional
objectives," simply stating that "this is not such a case." 13 2 Accordingly,
again the majority's rationale seems particularly limited to the case's unique
facts.
B. Justice Breyer's Concurrence
Justice Breyer's concurrence underscores this aspect of the majority's
decision, at least with respect to the obstruction of federal goals prong of the
preemption analysis. Justice Breyer emphasized the fact that the preamble to
the FDA regulations regarding preemption had not been subjected to notice
and comment rulemaking. He noted that it was "possible that state tort law
will sometimes interfere with the FDA's desire to create a drug label
containing a specific set of cautions and instructions," that "state tort law can
sometimes raise prices to the point where those who are sick are unable to
obtain the drugs they need," and that the FDA might seek to embody
determinations regarding when state tort law "acts as a help or a hindrance to
achieving the safe drug-related medical care.., in lawful specific regulations
describing, for example, labeling when requirements serve as a ceiling as
well as floor."'133 Accordingly, Justice Breyer wrote separately to underscore
that "it is possible that such determinations would have pre-emptive
effect."1 34
of how state law has interfered with the FDA's regulation of drug labeling during decades
of coexistence," id at 1201; see also id. at 1202-03 ("Failure-to-warn actions, in
particular, lend force to the FDCA's premise that manufacturers, not the FDA, bear
primary responsibility for their drug labeling at all times. Thus, the FDA long maintained
that state law offers an additional, and important, layer of consumer protection that
complements FDA regulation.").
131 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1204 ("Congress has repeatedly declined to pre-empt state
law, and the FDA's recently adopted position that state tort suits interfere with its
statutory mandate is entitled to no weight.").
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1204 (Breyer, J., concurring).
134 Id.
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C. Justice Thomas 's Concurrence
Justice Thomas's concurrence, in contrast, offered a far more restrictive
view regarding preemption that was motivated by his particular views
regarding the importance of federalism. Justice Thomas reiterated that he had
become "increasingly skeptical of th[e] Court's 'purposes and objectives'
pre-emption jurisprudence."' 135 He believed that the Court's precedents were
so broad that they often led to courts invalidating state laws based on
"perceived conflicts with broad federal policy objectives, legislative history,
or generalized notions of congressional purposes."'136
In Justice Thomas's view, this broad approach to preemption had eroded
the traditional role of the states vis-A-vis the federal government. In
particular, he was concerned with relying upon legislative history or agency
statements to preempt state law given that such pronouncements did not have
the force of law under the Supremacy Clause. 137 Rather, he would more
rigidly adhere to the text and structure of congressional statutes in
determining whether they preempted inconsistent state law.' 38 According to
Justice Thomas, "[p]re-emption must turn on whether state law conflicts with
the text of the relevant federal statute or with the federal regulations
authorized by that text."'139
He therefore joined the majority because "the text of the relevant federal
statutory provisions and the corresponding regulations do not directly
conflict with the state-law judgment before us."' 140 Here, Justice Thomas
found the text of the FDA's CBE regulation dispositive:
Under the FDA's "changes being effected" regulation, 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70(c)(6)(iii), which was promulgated pursuant to the FDA's statutory
authority, it is physically possible for Wyeth to market Phenergan in
compliance with federal and Vermont law. As the majority explains, Wyeth
could have changed the warning on its label regarding IV-push without
violating federal law .... The "changes being effected" regulation allows
drug manufacturers to change their labels without the FDA's preapproval if
the changes "add or strengthen a contraindication, warning, precaution, or
adverse reaction," § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A) .... in order to "reflect newly
acquired information," including "new analyses of previously submitted
135 Id. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
136 Id.
137 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1205 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment.).
138 See id.
139 Id. at 1208.
140 Id.
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data," 73 Fed.Reg. 49603, 49609. Under the terms of these regulations, after
learning of new incidences of gangrene-induced amputation resulting from
the IV-push administration of Phenergan .... federal law gave Wyeth the
authority to change Phenergan's label to "strengthen a... warning,"
"strengthen a... precaution," § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A), or to "strengthen an
instruction about.., administration [of the IV-push method] ... to increase
the safe use of the drug product," § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(C). Thus, it was
physically possible for Wyeth to comply with a state-law requirement to
provide stronger warnings on Phenergan about the risks of the IV-push
administration method while continuing to market Phenergan in compliance
with federal law. 1 4 1
Thus, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority that there was no preemption.
However, his rigid textualist approach differs dramatically from that of the
majority, which delved deeply into the facts and circumstances of the FDA
record to make a highly factual determination regarding whether the FDA
had actually considered the particular risks that were at issue in the state tort
litigation. Indeed, his analysis of the Court's precedents demonstrates how
broad they really are and how they depend in large part on the particular facts
and circumstances of an individual case. 142 There is simply no one-size-fits-
141 Id. at 1209-10 (alterations in original). Like the majority, Justice Thomas agreed
that "[i]nitial approval of a label amounts to a finding by the FDA that the label is safe for
purposes of gaining federal approval to market the drug. It does not represent a finding
that the drug, as labeled, can never be deemed unsafe by later federal action, or as in this
case, the application of state law." Id. at 1210.
142 According to Justice Thomas: "The cases improperly rely on legislative history,
broad atextual notions of congressional purpose, and even congressional inaction in order
to pre-empt state law." Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1211 (Thomas, J., concurring in the
judgment). Accordingly, he declined to "join the majority's analysis of this claim." Id.
Justice Thomas was particularly critical of the Court's decision in Geier:
The Court's decision in Geier to apply "purposes and objectives" pre-emption
based on agency comments, regulatory history, and agency litigating positions was
especially flawed, given that it conflicted with the plain statutory text of the saving
clause within the Safety Act, which explicitly preserved state common-law actions
by providing that "[c]ompliance with any Federal motor vehicle safety standard
issued under this subchapter does not exempt any person from any liability under
common law," 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k).
Id. at 1214. "Applying 'purposes and objectives' pre-emption in Geier, as in any case,
allowed this Court to vacate a judgment issued by another sovereign based on nothing
more than assumptions and goals that were untethered from the constitutionally enacted
federal law authorizing the federal regulatory standard that was before the Court." Id. at
1215.
2009] 1463
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
all approach in determining whether state action is preempted. Rather, each
case must be assessed on its own merits.
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Alito's dissent, which was joined by Justice Scalia, likewise
illustrates the highly factual nature of the preemption analysis after Wyeth.
The dissent fundamentally differed regarding critical facts in the record.
Most importantly, it found that "it is demonstrably untrue that the FDA failed
to consider (and strike a 'balance' between) the specific costs and benefits
associated with IV push."143 Rather, it maintained that "the record contains
ample evidence that the FDA specifically considered and reconsidered the
strength of Phenergan's IV-push-related warnings in light of new scientific
and medical data."'144 It proceeded to catalogue several points in the more
than fifty-year regulatory history of Phenergan where the FDA arguably
considered or addressed the risk of IV-push administration. 145 Moreover,
while it noted that it was irrelevant to the outcome of its analysis, 146 the
dissent believed that the continued use of the IV-push method of
administration was essentially at issue in the case given that the jury verdict
inherently involved a finding that this method of administration was
unsafe. 147
Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the case was essentially identical
to Geier. The dissent noted that, despite the fact that the statute at issue in
143 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1218 ("The FDA
has long known about the risks associated with IV push in general and its use to
administer Phenergan in particular.").
144Id. at 1222; see also id. at 1226 ("[W]hatever else might be said about the
extensive medical authorities and case reports that the FDA cited in 'support' of its
approval of IV-push administration of Phenergan, it cannot be said that the FDA 'paid no
more than passing attention to' IV push ... ; nor can it be said that the FDA failed to
weigh its costs and benefits.").
145 See id. at 1222-24.
146 The dissent explained that "the degree of a State's intrusion upon federal law is
irrelevant." Id. at 1227.
147 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1218 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]he question presented
by this case is not a 'narrow' one, and it does not concern whether Phenergan's label
should bear a 'stronger' warning. Rather, the real issue is whether a state tort jury can
countermand the FDA's considered judgment that Phenergan's FDA-mandated warning
label renders its intravenous (IV) use 'safe."'). in particular, the dissent pointed to the
allegations in the complaint and testimony during trial that made clear that the plaintiff
was alleging that the TV-push method of administration was unsafe as well as the trial
judge's charge to the jury. Id. at 1218 & n.2.
1464 [Vol. 70:6
PREEMPTIONAFTER WYETH
Geier had a savings clause stating that compliance with standards issued
under the federal statute did not preclude liability under the common law and
despite the fact that the Department of Transportation had authority only to
issue "minimum" safety standards, the Court had held that the state-law tort
suit was preempted. 148 "Because the Secretary determined that a menu of
alternative technologies was 'safe,' the doctrine of conflict pre-emption
barred Geier's efforts to deem some of those federally approved alternatives
'unsafe' under state tort law."'1 49 The dissent believed that the facts with
respect to Phenergan were analogous:
Through Phenergan's label, the FDA offered medical professionals a menu
of federally approved, "safe" and "effective" alternatives-including IV
push-for administering the drug. Through a state tort suit, respondent
attempted to deem IV push "unsafe" and "ineffective." To be sure, federal
law does not prohibit Wyeth from contraindicating IV push, just as federal
law did not prohibit Honda from installing airbags in all its cars. But just as
we held that States may not compel the latter, so, too, are States precluded
from compelling the former. 150
In fact, the dissent believed that preemption was "even more appropriate" in
the context of pharmaceutical products given that there was no savings clause
under the FDCA and there was "no evidence" that Congress intended that the
FDA "set only 'minimum standards. ' "l5 1 Moreover, it faulted the majority
for essentially ignoring "the FDA's explanation of the conflict between state
tort suits and the federal labeling regime, set forth in the agency's amicus
brief .... 1152
148 Id. at 1221 (citing Geier, 529 U.S. at 881).
149 Id.
150 Id.
151 Id.
152 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1229 (Alito, J., dissenting). The brief of the United States
stated, among other things:
[S]tate tort law that required a manufacturer to use different labeling than that
approved by FDA would disrupt the agency's balancing of health risks and benefits.
The FDA-approved labeling gives specific instructions on how to inject Phenergan
intravenously; respondent, in contrast, would impose further limits on such
injection-limits that might harm some patients' health by restricting their
physicians' treatment options. If a state regulatory agency directed drug
manufacturers not to use FDA-approved labeling, the conflict with federal law
would be manifest. As in Riegel, the fact that juries instead of an expert agency
would second-guess FDA's judgments in individual cases only exacerbates the
conflict.
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Moreover, the dissent noted that the preemption doctrine had important
policy implications. It observed that "drug labeling by jury verdict
undermines both our broader pre-emption jurisprudence and the broader
workability of the federal drug-labeling regime."'153 The dissent reasoned that
"[b]y their very nature, juries are ill-equipped to perform the FDA's cost-
benefit-balancing function" because they "tend to focus on the risk of a
particular product's design or warning label that arguably contributed to a
particular plaintiffs injury, not on the overall benefits of that design or
label."' 54 In contrast, the FDA may take a "long view" that considers the
interests of "all potential users of a drug."']55
The dissent believed that this was particularly true under the particular
circumstances of this case:
To be sure, state tort suits can peacefully coexist with the FDA's
labeling regime, and they have done so for decades.... But this case is far
from peaceful coexistence. The FDA told Wyeth that Phenergan's label
renders its use "safe." But the State of Vermont, through its tort law, said:
"Not so."' 156
Thus, both the majority and the dissent recognized that these were significant
concerns underlying the preemption doctrine. Nonetheless, because of their
different assessments of the record, they came to different conclusions
regarding whether these concerns were implicated under the circumstances of
the case. In addition, the dissent noted that plaintiff was not left without a
remedy for her injury. Rather, it asserted that she may have "an ideal
medical-malpractice case." 157
III. THE SCOPE OF PREEMPTION AFTER WYETH
While some commentators have suggested that Wyeth deals a significant
blow to those seeking to invoke the preemption doctrine to bar state lawsuits
involving pharmaceutical products, the decision itself demonstrates that the
Brief for the United States, supra note 124, at 9.
153 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1222 (Alito, J., dissenting); see also id. at 1220 ("Neither
the FDCA nor its implementing regulations suggest that juries may second-guess the
FDA's labeling decisions.").
154 Id. at 1229-30.
155 Id. at 1230.
156 Id. at 1231.
157 Id. at 1218. The dissent noted that the plaintiff had, in fact, brought and settled
such a suit against her physician, the physician's assistant, and the hospital at which she
was treated. See id. at 1218 n.3.
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preemption doctrine is far from dead. Rather, the logic of the decision makes
clear that the doctrine should apply where the record demonstrates that the
FDA has actually considered the risks at issue in the state lawsuit and thus
provided an analysis that might conflict with state-law tort liability.
A. A Context-Dependent Analysis
The Court specifically preserved preemption claims where the record
indicates that the FDA has actually considered a particular risk, and yet has
not required an additional warning. Its decision in this regard was consistent
with other lower court decisions, which had focused on the FDA's actual
consideration of the risks at issue in determining that state-law claims were
preempted. 158 Thus, the Court's decision in Wyeth is best viewed as a narrow
one that was not intended to work a major shift in the Court's preemption
jurisprudence.
This is further borne out by the Court's treatment of another recent
pending case concerning preemption of state law claims involving a
pharmaceutical product, Colacicco v. Apotex Inc.159 In Colacicco, the Third
Circuit held that, where the FDA had specifically rejected the need for an
additional warning regarding the risk of suicide in patients taking
antidepressant SSRIs, plaintiff's claims challenging the absence of the
additional warning were preempted.' 60 The Supreme Court did not
158 See, e.g., Dowhal v. Smithkline Beecham Consumer Healthcare, 88 P.3d 1 (Cal.
2004); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1699
CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2006) (cardiovascular risk claims
preempted where FDA "specifically considered whether Celebrex poses a greater risk of
adverse cardiovascular events than other NSAIDS" and found that the claim was
"scientifically unsubstantiated"); Needleman v. Pfizer Inc., No. 3:03-CV-3074-N, 2004
WL 1773697, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2004) (holding claims preempted where "FDA
has clearly determined that a warning linking Zoloft and suicide would be false,
misleading, and harmful to patients"); Dusek v. Pfizer Inc., No. H-02-3559, 2004 WL
2191804, at *9-10 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 20, 2004) (same).
159 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009); see also Mary J.
Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the FDA, 48 B.C. L.
REv. 1089, 1098 (2007) (observing that "[a]n increasing number of prescription drug
labeling cases have been defended successfully" on grounds similar to Colacicco).
160 Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 271, 276. Not only did the court conclude that the claims
were preempted, but the United States filed an amicus brief in the case arguing for that
result:
To base a tort judgment on drug manufacturers' failure to warn in October 2003 of
an association between adult use of paroxetine hydrochloride and suicide or
suicidality, despite FDA's judgment at that time that there was not reasonable
scientific evidence of such an association, would be to demand a warning statement
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summarily reverse the Colacicco decision. Instead, it remanded the case "for
further consideration" in light of its decision in Wyeth. 161
The key factual distinction between Wyeth and Colacicco is spelled out
in the Third Circuit's decision. Not only was the record clear in Colacicco
that the FDA had considered the specific risks at issue in the litigation, but
the court's rejection of the plaintiffs position regarding those risks was
express:
In this case we need not speculate on the rationale of the FDA for its
failure to require the adult suicidality warnings. Not only has the FDA filed
an amicus brief in the Colacicco action but it has repeatedly rejected the
scientific basis for the warnings that Colacicco and McNellis argue should
have been included in the labeling. The FDA has actively monitored the
possible association between SSRIs and suicide for nearly twenty years, and
has concluded that the suicide warnings desired by plaintiffs are without
scientific basis and would therefore be false and misleading. 162
Among other things, the FDA had "specifically rejected citizen petitions in
1991, 1992, and 1997 which sought to either withdraw approval of Prozac as
a result of its asserted association with suicide or to include a suicide warning
on the labeling of that drug."'163 After considering the matter, "[i]n each
instance, the FDA concluded that there was insufficient evidence to take the
actions requested." 164 The FDA had also filed amicus briefs in pending
litigation stating that it had concluded that there was "no scientific basis for a
warning suggesting that Zoloft causes suicidality."'165 While the FDA
that would have been false or misleading, and thus contrary to federal law. In such a
case, as the district court properly recognized, federal law must prevail.
Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees at 2,
Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253 (3d Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3107).
161 Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1578, 1578-79 (2009).
162 Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 269 (citation omitted). As the court explained, this
conflict was sufficient to preempt the state law claims:
Because the standard for adding a warning to drug labeling is the existence of
"reasonable evidence of an association of a serious hazard with a drug," and the
FDCA authorizes the FDA to prohibit false or misleading labeling, a state-law
obligation to include a warning asserting the existence of an association between
SSRIs and suicidality directly conflicts with the FDA's oft-repeated conclusion that
the evidence did not support such an association.
Id. at 271 (footnote omitted).
163 Id. at 269.
164 Id.165 Id. at 270.
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engaged in a reevaluation of the evidence linking suicide to SSRIs in
pediatric and adult patients, at the same time "the FDA continued to
announce its rejection of adult suicidality warnings for SSRIs."'166 As a
result, the court observed, it need go no further:
[W]e need not decide whether preemption would be appropriate under
different facts-such as where the FDA had not rejected the substance of
the warning sought or where the FDA only stated its position after a lawsuit
had been initiated-or under the broader theories of preemption argued by
the parties. 167
The FDA had "clearly and publicly stated its position."' 68 Indeed, the court
expressly contrasted the facts before it with those facing the Vermont
Supreme Court in Wyeth, which had found that there was no record evidence
that the FDA had considered the specific risks at issue.169
Another example of this sort of conflict is presented in the California
Supreme Court's decision in Dowhal v. Smithkline Beecham Consumer
Healthcare.170 There, the court held that there was a conflict between
warnings for over-the-counter smoking cessation products under California
law and those required by the FDA. Specifically, the State of California had
sought to require additional warnings regarding the use of nicotine
replacement therapies by pregnant women. The FDA had expressly denied
the manufacturers' request to conform their warnings to those required under
California law, fearing that the additional warnings overstated the risks and
might discourage the use of such products by women who smoked, and had
indicated that "[a]ny additional or modified warning may render the product
166 Colacicco, 521 F.3d at 271.
167 Id.
168 Id.
169 Id. at 272 n. 17. Likewise, in opposing Wyeth's petition for certiorari, plaintiff
had argued that the case "does not genuinely present [the] question" whether "'labeling
judgments' made by the FDA regarding a drug's safety and efficacy preempt state-law
product liability claims premised on 'differing label judgments' because "the Vermont
Supreme Court correctly found, as a matter of fact, that Ms. Levine's recovery was not
based on a labeling judgment different from a labeling judgment made by the FDA."
Respondent's Supplemental Brief in Response to Brief of the United States at 5, Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009) (No. 06-1249). As plaintiff explained, "Wyeth's claim for
preemption rests on its assertion that the FDA had specifically considered and rejected a
label change that would have prohibited IV-push administration of Phenergan. But the
Vermont Supreme Court rejected that argument as having no factual basis in the record."
Id.
170 88 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2004).
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misbranded." 171 While the FDA allowed the manufacturers to modify the
warnings in some respects, it denied the request to conform the warnings to
the specific language required under California law.172
Given this conflict between state and federal regulation, the California
Supreme Court held that the preemption doctrine applied.' 73 As the court
observed, the FDA-approved warning label implemented "a nuanced goal-
to inform women of the risks of [nicotine replacement therapy] products, but
in a way that will not lead some women, overly concerned about those risks,
to continue smoking." 174 The State of California, in contrast, sought to
implement a "more single-minded goal of informing the consumer of the
risks," even if such additional warnings might discourage the beneficial use
of nicotine replacement products.175
B. Preemption After Notice-and-Comment Rulemaking
As Justice Breyer's concurrence suggests, an even broader principle of
preemption may apply where it is specifically endorsed by the FDA after
notice-and-comment rulemaking. In Geier,176 for example, the Department
of Transportation had engaged in such formal rulemaking. 177 The Court held
that, under such circumstances, claims inconsistent with the Department of
Transportation's approach were preempted. The majority in Wyeth did not
purport to overrule Geier in this respect. Indeed, the majority specifically
relied upon that decision in distinguishing the lack of formal rulemaking in
the case of the FDA's labeling preamble, which did not allow states to have
any input in the FDA's decisionmaking. 178
As Justice Breyer observed, this is significant given that it preserves the
FDA's ability to preempt state action that might interfere with its expert
assessment of the safety and efficacy of pharmaceutical products. As a result,
if the FDA believes that the states are encroaching on its ability to carry out
its mission, it can act affirmatively to preempt their ability to do so. Thus,
under the Court's broad view of the preemption doctrine, not only the elected
171 Id. at 5-6.
172 Id. at 10-11.
113 Id. at 15.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
177 See Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1203.
178 See id. ("[W]e have no occasion in this case to consider the pre-emptive effect of
a specific agency regulation bearing the force of law.").
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officials in Congress, but federal agencies such as the FDA may directly
impact the scope of state activity.
C. Preemption Where There Is an Approved Use
There may be other situations in which there is such an apparent conflict
between FDA regulation and a state tort suit requiring the application of the
preemption doctrine. As the majority observed, it was not called upon to
decide "whether a state rule proscribing intravenous administration [of
Phenergan] would be pre-empted."' 79 There may be particular problems with
bringing claims alleging that pharmaceutical products are unsafe where the
FDA has specifically approved the product as safe and effective.
Both the majority and the Vermont Supreme Court held that there was no
need to address this question because the continued use of the IV-push means
of administration was not at issue in the state lawsuit. Nonetheless, the
dissent issued by the Chief Justice of the Vermont Supreme Court lays out
the framework for the argument in favor of preemption under such
circumstances. 18 0 It is difficult to reconcile a state law claim that effectively
asks a jury to conclude that a particular product should not be on the market
or a means of use should be prohibited where the FDA has specifically
addressed the issue and has concluded that the benefits outweigh the risks.
Such decisions would significantly undermine the FDA's regulatory
authority. Moreover, they would plainly present a direct conflict with FDA
action. Under such circumstances, therefore, preemption is fully warranted.
D. Preemption of Fraud-on-the-FDA Claims
The ruling in Wyeth likewise does not purport to overrule the Court's
prior ruling in Buckman that so-called fraud-on-the-FDA claims were
preempted. 181 To the contrary, the majority specifically noted that decision in
its opinion. 182 In Buckman, the Court found that "[s]tate-law fraud-on-the-
FDA claims inevitably conflict with the FDA's responsibility to police fraud
17 9 Id. at 1194.
180 See supra Section I.E.2.
181 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001). For a discussion of Buckman, see Ausness, supra note
92, at 960-62.
182 Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1195 n.3.
2009] 1471
OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL
consistently with the Administration's judgment and objectives. '183
Accordingly, such claims were squarely preempted.
This aspect of the preemption doctrine works in conjunction with
preemption of failure-to-warn claims. Where plaintiffs cannot allege a failure
to warn because such claims would be preempted, they may argue that the
FDA did not have all of the information necessary to evaluate the safety of a
pharmaceutical product or the appropriateness of its labeling because the
manufacturer allegedly withheld adverse information from the FDA.
Buckman makes clear that such claims are likewise preempted because
Congress understood that the FDA would have authority to police such
activity.' 84 The two doctrines therefore complement each other by
prohibiting plaintiffs from circumventing the preemption doctrine that would
otherwise bar their failure-to-warn claims.
IV. WYETH IN THE CONTEXT OF THE COURT'S OTHER PREEMPTION
CASES
Despite the narrow holding in Wyeth, the Court's preemption decisions
overall manifest a strong defense of the doctrine in cases in which federal
regulation may conflict with state lawsuits.1 85 As noted above, the Court in
Wyeth did not purport to overrule these prior precedents. For example, it
specifically distinguished Geier on its facts, arguing that the case was
distinguishable because in Geier there was an actual conflict between
Department of Transportation regulation of air bags and the state action
being challenged. Likewise, the Court did not purport to overrule precedents
such as Buckman, which held that fraud-on-the-FDA claims were
183 531 U.S. at 350.
184 See, e.g., Colacicco v. Apotex Inc., 521 F.3d 253, 271 (3d Cir. 2008) (noting that
not only failure-to-warn claims, but also plaintiff's fraud-on-the-FDA claims were
preempted), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 1578 (2009); In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales
Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 05-1699 CRB, 2006 WL 2374742, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 16, 2006) ("The law is well established that a claim premised on a drug
manufacturer's failure to provide data to the FDA is preempted.").
185 For a general discussion of the preemption doctrine, see Viet D. Dinh,
Reassessing the Law of Preemption, 88 GEO. L.J. 2085 (2000); Stephen A. Gardbaum,
The Nature of Preemption, 79 CORNELL L. REv. 767 (1994); Roderick M. Hills, Jr.,
Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1 (2007); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 252 (2000).
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preempted, 8 6 or Riegel, which held that the preemption doctrine barred
certain claims regarding medical devices. 187
These precedents, taken together, evidence a broad trend in favor of an
expansive preemption doctrine. Indeed, as Justice Thomas noted in his
concurrence, it is a doctrine that in many respects has been construed
extremely broadly, extending to situations in which it is not completely clear
that state action would impede federal goals or objectives and relying on a
wide range of indirect evidence to demonstrate that there is some
inconsistency between federal and state action. 188
This trend seems motivated, in part, by a skepticism regarding jury
decision making, particularly when contrasted with the expert decision
making involved in FDA regulation. In Riegel, for example, the majority
observed that "[s]tate tort law that requires a manufacturer's catheters to be
safer, but hence less effective, than the model the FDA has approved disrupts
the federal scheme no less than state regulatory law to the same effect. '189 In
fact, the Court opined that "tort law, applied by juries under a negligence or
strict-liability standard, is less deserving of preservation" because "[a] state
statute, or a regulation adopted by a state agency, could at least be expected
to apply cost-benefit analysis similar to that applied by the experts at the
FDA."190 In contrast, a jury deciding a negligence action "sees only the cost
of a more dangerous design, and is not concerned with its benefits; the
patients who reaped those benefits are not represented in court." 191
The Court in Buckman likewise cited the importance of the FDA's expert
review and the "delicate balance of statutory objectives" inherent in that
analysis. 192 The Court noted that the FDA's review involves "difficult (and
often competing) objectives."' 93 Among other things, the FDA must ensure
that drugs are both safe and effective while at the same time allowing
beneficial drugs to proceed promptly to market.194 In addition, it must
regulate in a manner that does not "intrud[e] upon decisions statutorily
committed to the discretion of health care professionals."' 95
186 531 U.S. 341, 353 (2001).
187 128 S. Ct. 999, 1001 (2008).
188 See supra Section H.C.
189 128 S. Ct. at 1008.
190 Id.
191 Id.
192 531 U.S. at 348.
193 Id. at 349.
194 Id. at 349-50.
195 Id. at 350.
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Even those cases in which the Court has found that there is no
preemption give important guidance. For example, in Bates v. Dow
Agrosciences LLC, the Court held that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) did not preempt claims for defective design,
defective manufacture, negligent testing, breach of express warranty, or
violation of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act in a case brought by
Texas peanut farmers who were complaining that their crops were damaged
by herbicide sold by Dow Agrosciences. 196 However, the Court remanded for
further proceedings as to the plaintiffs' fraud and failure-to-warn claims,
emphasizing that "a state-law labeling requirement must in fact be equivalent
to a requirement under FIFRA in order to survive pre-emption."' 197 In
particular, the Court noted that "a failure-to-warn claim alleging that a given
pesticide's label should have stated 'DANGER' instead of the more subdued
'CAUTION' would be pre-empted because it is inconsistent with 40 CFR
§ 156.64 (2004), which specifically assigns these warnings to particular
classes of pesticides based on their toxicity."'198
A similar rule may be applied in the context of pharmaceutical products.
Where the FDA has specifically considered the particular risks at issue in a
state lawsuit and has crafted particular warnings to address those risks, state
lawsuits claiming that such warnings are inadequate may be preempted. The
common theme running through cases such as Wyeth and Bates is that, where
a federal agency specifically considers an issue, inconsistent state-law action
should be barred.
V. THE BALANCE THE COURT HAS STRUCK
While the Wyeth decision does not authorize across-the-board, automatic
preemption for all failure-to-warn claims, it does provide guidance to
determine which claims may be preempted. In doing so, the Court has struck
a balance between several important considerations. One may ask whether an
across-the-board rule of preemption would be preferable given the significant
costs associated with modern-day tort litigation. Nonetheless, the Court's
196 544 U.S. 431, 452 (2005).
197 Id. at 453.
198 Id. Justice Thomas and Justice Scalia elaborated on these requirements in their
separate concurrence, noting that "[a] state-law cause of action, even if not specific to
labeling, nevertheless imposes a labeling requirement 'in addition to or different from'
FIFRA's when it attaches liability to statements on the label that do not produce liability
under FIFRA." Id. at 456 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
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decision arguably preserves many of the benefits of the preemption doctrine
while avoiding certain potential costs.
First, Wyeth preserves the preemption doctrine in cases where there is an
actual conflict between FDA regulation and state litigation. In doing so, it
avoids certain potentially unnecessary costs of the preemption doctrine by
making clear that if the FDA has not considered a particular risk in crafting
labeling for a pharmaceutical product, then state law failure-to-warn claims
are not preempted. This avoids a situation where preemption may be applied
to bar a state-law claim where there is no actual conflict between federal and
state regulation. In such circumstances, the rationale for the preemption
doctrine is absent. However, at the same time, the Court's decision preserves
the benefits of the preemption doctrine by making clear that it applies in
cases where the FDA has actually considered the particular risks at issue and
as a result there is an actual conflict.
Second, the Court has retained the preemption doctrine in cases where
there is a genuine concern that jury decision making might undermine the
expert balancing of risks and benefits by the FDA. 199 Because the
preemption doctrine applies in cases where the FDA has considered
particular risks and engaged in a balancing of those risks against the benefits
of a pharmaceutical product, it ensures that juries will not be allowed to
second-guess such expert decision making. Where, in contrast, no such
process has been undertaken, the Court's decision in Wyeth holds that the
preemption doctrine is inapplicable. Again, the Court has drawn a line that
arguably preserves the benefits of the preemption doctrine while avoiding
unnecessary costs.
Third, the Court's decision will prevent the imposition of unwarranted
liability in appropriate circumstances. These costs can be significant,
preventing innovation and the development of pharmaceutical products that
199 Cf Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 496 (1996) (FDA "is uniquely
qualified to determine whether a particular form of state law stands as an obstacle to
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress");
Weinberger v. Bentex Pharms. Inc., 412 U.S. 645, 654 (1973) (observing that "[t]he
determination whether a drug is generally recognized as safe and effective... necessarily
implicates complex chemical and pharmacological considerations ... within the [FDA's]
peculiar expertise"); Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public
Risk Management in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 335 (1985) (observing that,
while "[riegulatory agencies are equipped to make the risk comparisons on which all
progressive transformation of the risk environment must be based," "[t]he courts are
simply not qualified to second-guess such decisions" and that when they do so, "they
routinely make regressive risk choices").
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may have significant benefits.200 Where the FDA has considered particular
risks and addressed them as it deemed appropriate in its expert opinion, juries
will be prevented from imposing liability. The Court's decision in this regard
therefore preserves an important benefit of the preemption doctrine.
Nonetheless, the Court could have gone even further. There may be instances
in which the FDA has not considered a particular risk, either because it
emerged after FDA approval or because it was not brought to the FDA's
attention. The preemption doctrine may not apply in such circumstances even
though the particular risk does not warrant the imposition of liability. Thus,
the Wyeth decision may forego certain potential benefits of a broader
preemption doctrine. Nonetheless, it avoids the costs associated with a
situation where a risk was not considered by the FDA and actually does
warrant the imposition of liability.20 1 In such circumstances, an across-the-
board rule of preemption would bar liability where, on balance, it may
potentially be appropriate. The Court's line drawing avoids these costs, but
only at a price-by giving up certain additional benefits that might be
obtained under a broader preemption doctrine.
Fourth, the Court's decision will prevent "overwarning" that might result
in the inappropriate use of a pharmaceutical product due to confusion or
which might actually discourage the use of beneficial drugs. 202 As the FDA
200 See, e.g., Louis Lasagna, The Chilling Effect of Product Liability on New Drug
Development, in THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND
INNOVATION 334, 335-37 (Peter W. Huber & Robert E. Litan eds., 1991); Lars Noah,
Triage in the Nation's Medicine Cabinet: The Puzzling Scarcity of Vaccines and Other
Drugs, 54 S.C. L. REV. 371, 392 (2002); W. Kip Viscusi et al., A Statistical Profile of
Pharmaceutical Industry Liability, 1976-1989, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1418, 1419
(1994) (noting that "the net effect of the surge in liability costs had been to discourage
innovation in the pharmaceutical industry"); see also Howard A. Denemark, Improving
Litigation Against Drug Manufacturers for Failure to Warn Against Possible Side
Effects: Keeping Dubious Lawsuits from Driving Good Drugs off the Market, 40 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 413, 413 (1989-1990) ("Beneficial drugs, approved by [the FDA], have
been forced off the market by the current legal standards for imposing a duty on drug
manufacturers to warn of adverse side effects from their drugs."); Margaret Gilhooley,
Innovative Drugs, Products Liability, Regulatory Compliance, and Patient Choice, 24
SETON HALL L. REv. 1481, 1483 (1994) ("[M]edical experts have expressed concern that
uncertain liability standards, coupled with litigation costs, may discourage useful drug
innovation.").
201 See Denemark, supra note 200, at 431 (arguing that "the FDA can rely on the
incentives of the tort system to encourage manufacturers to continue research, reveal
research results honestly, monitor scientific literature, and request or issue appropriate
warnings" and that "[p]reemption would remove those incentives").
202 See Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription
Drug and Biological Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3922, 3935 (Jan. 24, 2006) ("Overwarning,
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observed in its 2006 regulations, adding too much information to the labeling
"could result in scientifically unsubstantiated warnings and underutilization
of beneficial treatments." 20 3 "[L]abeling that includes theoretical hazards not
well-grounded in scientific evidence can cause meaningful risk information
to 'lose its significance.' 20 4 In addition, overcrowding of labels with
unnecessary warnings may "limit physician appreciation of potentially far
more significant contraindications and side effects." 205 Because the
preemption doctrine applies in cases where the FDA has specifically
considered potential risks, overwarning may be avoided at least where the
FDA has actually acted. Again, the Court's decision does not extend the
preemption doctrine to every instance in which there may be a tangible
benefit. Where the FDA has not considered the issue, the doctrine may not
always apply. However, the Court's decision nonetheless does preserve these
benefits in a large category of cases.
Fifth, the Wyeth decision may result in the creation of some new and
additional costs and, potentially, some additional benefits. Because
preemption applies in circumstances where the FDA has actually considered
certain risks, manufacturers will have an incentive to submit as much
just like underwarning, can.., have a negative effect on patient safety and public
health."); W. Kip Viscusi, Individual Rationality, Hazard Warnings, and the Foundations
of Tort Law, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 625, 665-66 (1996) ("Excessive warnings are not
innocuous.... [I]f warnings are included for inconsequential risks, they will serve to
further dilute the warnings for the real hazards that should be identified to consumers.").
But see Mary J. Davis, The Battle Over Implied Preemption: Products Liability and the
FDA, 48 B.C. L. REv. 1089, 1140-41 (2007) (questioning concerns regarding
overwarning).
203 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935. Even before the 2006 regulations, the FDA observed that
"it would be inappropriate to require statements in drug labeling that do not contribute to
the safe and effective use of the drug, but instead are intended solely to influence civil
litigation in which the agency has no part." Content and Format for Labeling for Human
Prescription Drugs, 44 Fed. Reg. 37,434, 37,435 (June 26, 1979).
204 Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3935.
205 Id. As the FDA explained:
Given the comprehensiveness of FDA regulation of drug safety, effectiveness, and
labeling under the act, additional requirements for the disclosure of risk information
are not necessarily more protective of patients. Instead, they can erode and disrupt
the careful and truthful representation of benefits and risks that prescribers need to
make appropriate judgments about drug use. Exaggeration of risk could discourage
appropriate use of a beneficial drug.
Id. The FDA further noted that this problem was of particular concern because "[i]n
recent years, there has been an increase in the length, detail, and complexity of
prescription drug labeling, making it harder for health care practitioners to find specific
information and to discern the most critical information." Id. at 3922.
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information as possible to the FDA both at the initial approval stage and in
subsequent submissions. This may result in the FDA being deluged with
information that may have only marginal value.20 6 On the other hand, it does
give manufacturers an added incentive to make full and complete disclosure
to the FDA. Accordingly, the Court's decision in Wyeth may create some
additional costs, and potentially benefits, in terms of the regulatory process.
Sixth, the decision in Wyeth gives manufacturers an incentive to
implement CBE amendments to their labeling more readily in order to avoid
gaps in the preemption doctrine. This may again lead to potential costs as
manufacturers implement changes to their labeling of dubious value simply
to avoid the risk of potential liability for failure to act. Likewise, it may
increase the FDA's workload given that, ultimately, the agency must review
all such labeling changes.20 7 Finally, it may impose an unnecessary risk on
manufacturers that their label change will be rejected and their amended label
will be deemed misleading.20 8 The Food and Drug Act specifically prohibits
the introduction into commerce of misbranded drugs, which includes drugs
whose labeling is "false or misleading in any particular" or lacks "adequate
directions for use."209
Finally, the Wyeth decision does provide some level of protection for the
traditional role of the states in this area and thus furthers to some extent the
principles of federalism. 210 The Court could have gone much farther in this
regard, holding, for example, that state law failure-to-warn claims are never
preempted. Nonetheless, by holding that such claims were not always
206 The Supreme Court noted a similar concern in Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs' Legal
Committee, observing that allowing state-law fraud-on-the-FDA claims might cause
manufacturers "to submit a deluge of information that [FDA] neither wants nor needs."
See 531 U.S. 341, 351 (2001).
207 See Supplements and Other Changes to an Approved Application, 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70(c)(6) (2009).
208 As the FDA explained in its 2006 preamble:
While a sponsor is permitted to add risk information to the [label] without first
obtaining FDA approval via a CBE supplement, FDA reviews all such submissions
and may later deny approval of the supplement, and the labeling remains subject to
enforcement action if the added information makes the labeling false or misleading
under section 502(a) of the act ....
Requirements on Content and Format, 71 Fed. Reg. at 3934. Some of this risk may be
mitigated, however, by consulting with the FDA prior to adding any information to the
labeling.
209 Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 33 1(a), 352(a), (f) (2006).
210 See Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996) ("[B]ecause the States are
independent sovereigns in our federal system, we have long presumed that Congress does
not cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.").
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preempted and requiring that there be an actual conflict between state
litigation and federal regulation before the preemption doctrine applied, the
Court preserved to some extent the role of the states in this area.
VI. CONCLUSION
At bottom, the outcome in Wyeth v. Levine was strongly dependent on
the unique factual record in that case. The majority construed the record as
lacking evidence showing that the FDA had actually considered the risks at
issue in the state-law tort suit. Without such consideration, there could be no
conflict and thus no preemption, at least under the unique circumstances
presented in Wyeth. Indeed, much of the dissent focused on attempting to
dispute the majority's characterization of the record with respect to this
critical finding.
As a result, the decision cannot be viewed as a sweeping prohibition on
the use of preemption in the context of FDA-approved pharmaceutical
products. Rather, the majority's opinion leaves room for application of the
doctrine in circumstances where the record demonstrates that the FDA or
other federal agencies have specifically considered the risks at issue in the
state court lawsuit. Where such consideration exists, there exists the potential
for a conflict between the FDA's reasoned judgment and the outcome of a
state-law tort suit alleging a failure to warn.
A contrary ruling would be inconsistent with the Court's other
preemption decisions, such as its decision in Geier.211 The Court there noted
the important policies underlying the preemption doctrine and gave it broad
effect to ensure that federal objectives were not undermined by state court
actions and to preserve uniformity where the federal government had decided
to act.
It would also lead to undesirable consequences as a practical matter. In
addition to the potential problems associated with a lack of uniformity that
would develop if juries in fifty-two separate jurisdictions could
independently craft standards that were inconsistent with federal standards,
such an outcome would undermine the value of having such determinations
made by experts at the federal level in a process in which all affected parties
211 See, e.g., CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 674-75 (1993)
(federal maximum train speed regulation preempted negligence suit alleging excessive
train speed); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 66-67 (1988) (FCC regulation
establishing standards for cable television signal quality preempted inconsistent state
regulation); Fid. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 170 (1982)
(Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulation regarding due-on-sale clauses in mortgages
preempted contrary state common law rule).
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may participate. Federal agencies such as the FDA have been created, at least
in part, precisely because there is a value to having a single entity with
nationwide authority making decisions that necessarily require the
application of specialized expertise to sometimes highly technical scientific
information. Such decisions could well have been left to individual states.
However, Congress chose to establish a federal regulatory regime precisely
to avoid the potential pitfalls associated with state-by-state regulation in this
important area. Thus, some form of the preemption doctrine is arguably
needed to give effect to these federal policies.
Once one has decided to establish a federal regulatory system, it makes
little sense to allow state regulation, much less the decisions of individuals
randomly selected from the general population who lack the specialized
expertise of federal regulators, to undermine that very system. Accordingly,
both the Court's precedents, and common sense warrant the continued
application of the preemption doctrine.
